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…la théorie marxiste est hantée, dans son dispositif même, par un certain rapport à 
la pratique, qui est à la fois une pratique existante, et en même temps une pratique 
transformée, la politique. 
Louis Althusser 
"Marx et l'Histoire" 
5 May, 1975 
IMEC, ALT2. A22-01.10 
 
 
In 1965, Louis Althusser argued that, for the success of the worker’s 
movement, everything depended on theory.1 By 1976, however, he had abandoned 
this call to theory and had begun to argue that “everything…depends on “the 
‘concrete analysis of the ‘concrete situation’.”2 The reasons for this change of 
emphasis are complex and have to do with revisions that Althusser made to his 
understandings of philosophy, science, politics, and ideology after his call for the 
French Communist Party [PCF] to be guided by theoreticians was rejected in 1966 
and after he had come to the conclusion that his original schematization of 
material practices was flawed.3 These revisions included a rethinking of Marx’s 
                                                
1 G. M. Goshgarian, Introduction to The Humanist Controversy and Other Writings, by Louis 
Althusser, (London: Verso, 2003), xi-xii; and Louis Althusser, 1965, “Theory, Theoretical Practice 
and Theoretical Formation: Ideology and Ideological Struggle,” in Philosophy and the Spontaneous 
Philosophy of the Scientist and Other Essays, ed. Gregory Elliott (London: Verso, 1990), 37-42. 
2 Louis Althusser, 1978, unpublished typescript, “Que faire?,” Fonds Althusser, ALT2.A26-05.06, 
Institut Mémoire de l’Édition Contemporaine, Caen, France, 1-2 (hereafter cited as Fonds Althusser). 
3 Goshgarian, “Introduction to Humanist Controversy”; and William Lewis, “Knowledge versus 
‘Knowledge’: Louis Althusser on the Autonomy of Science and Philosophy from Ideology,” 
Rethinking Marxism 17, no. 3 (July 2005): 462-65. 
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historical materialist methodology, a disavowal of his previous claim for the 
conceptual unity of Marxist philosophy, and a radical revision of the ontological 
and epistemological claims he had advanced in For Marx and Reading Capital. 4 
Though all of these revisions factor into and motivate Althusser’s demand for 
Concrete Analysis, the most relevant are probably the revisions made to his 
ontology and to his epistemology. In regard to the former, Althusser modified his 
claim that economic, political, philosophical, ideological, and scientific practices 
develop in parallel and that they are conceptually and practically distinct. This 
claim was replaced with an assertion that, though we may analytically distinguish 
among them, these practices are always mixed and interrelated. In line with this 
revision, his epistemological claims that scientific practice produces truth and that 
philosophy guarantees the internal coherency of a science5 were replaced with a 
theory of inquiry which helt that that scientific practice—though always 
compromised by ideology—tends in the long run to produce correct results due to 
its interaction with the material real. Now understood as a critical practice rather 
than as a truth guaranteeing or legitimating practice, post-revision, Althusser argued 
that philosophy’s role was to help science with this excision, separating that which 
was ideological and incorrect from that which was scientific and correct.6 In line 
with this change, historical materialism was re-envisioned as that science which 
investigates the “conditions and forms of class struggle.”7 
Taking as a starting point the assumption that Louis Althusser’s revisions to 
his original re-reading of Marxism were necessary corrections8 and that the method 
                                                
4 Louis Althusser, 1977, "Avant-Propos du livre de G. Duménil, Le Concept de loi économique dans 
<<le Capital>>,” in Solitude de Machiavel, ed. Yves Sintomer (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 
1998); and Louis Althusser, March 1978, unpublished lecture notes, “Cours sur le mode 
d’exposition chez Marx,” ALT2.A28-01.05 (Fonds Althusser), 1-13. 
5 Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, Reading Capital (New York: Verso, 1970), 42. 
6 Louis Althusser, 1967, “Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists,” in 
Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists and Other Essays, ed. Gregory Elliott 
(London: Verso, 1990), 103. 
7 Althusser, “Que faire?,” ALT2.A26-05.06 (Fonds Althusser), 53. 
8 Lewis, “Knowledge versus ‘Knowledge’,” and Étienne Balibar, “Althusser’s Object” Social Text 39 
(1994): 157-88. Some, including Gregory Elliott, in Althusser: The Detour of Theory (New York: 
Verso, 1987), 270, might disagree and argue for his early work. 
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of Concrete Analysis advanced out of these corrections is not only of historical 
interest but that it also has something to offer political theory and democratic 
politics, this paper provides an exposition of Althusser’s understanding of Concrete 
Analysis between 1976 and 1978. However, as Althusser himself only ever 
partially developed Concrete Analysis and because what he did say about it and its 
promise often contradicts that which he simultaneously maintained about the 
ability of social science to overcome ideological biases, this exposition cannot be a 
simple one.  
In order to complete Althusser’s unfinished work on Concrete Analysis as 
well as to illuminate and overcome its contradictions, this paper will draw upon 
recent work in the philosophy of the social sciences and particularly on Pragmatic 
Critical Social Theory. The hope is that, with this critique and reconstruction, the 
practice’s usefulness to democratic decision making processes will be suggested. In 
line with this reconstruction, this paper will end with the claim that, if everything 
(including democracy) really does depend on Concrete Analysis, then that which 
democracy depends upon is a Pragmatic Critical Social Theory self-consciously 
advanced from a specific class position. Such a reconstructed critical theory must 
draw upon the best work in the social sciences to make its arguments. Its success, 
however, will be judged not exclusively by other social scientists but by its 
effectiveness in encouraging and enabling actual democratic changes to our socio-
economic relationships. 
 
The Theoretical and Political Context for Concrete Analysis 
In 1976, when Althusser began demanding that the French Communist Party  
practice Concrete Analysis, the Party was (yet again) trying to de-Stalinize. Facing 
unfavorable comparisons with “westernized” or westernizing CP’s in Spain and 
Italy and embarrassed by recent revelations regarding Soviet Gulags and other 
atrocities whose existence it had previously willfully overlooked, the PCF was 
desirous of shedding some of its more radical positions. These positions included 
its long-held insistence on the necessity of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat as well 
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as its fealty to the Soviet Union. Not for the first time in its history was the PCF in a 
directional crisis. At the time, and for its political survival, the Party was being 
forced to decide between continued loyalty to the Soviet Union and to certain 
traditionally accepted tenets of Marxism-Leninism or to pursuing a path that would 
make it more palatable to the broader French Left as well as more in step with the 
practices of “euro-communism.” Althusser’s call for Concrete Analysis was 
motivated by many of these same concerns and by his feeling that the PCF and the 
global communist movement were in crisis.9 However, instead of seeing these 
problems as merely political, he also believed that they were epistemological and 
methodological: if the PCF was to survive this crisis and to realize its goals, it 
needed to be certain of what the right moves were for it to make both in terms of 
dealing with its past and in terms of deciding future actions.  
With his 1976 introduction to Dominique Lecourt’s Lyssenko: histoire réelle 
d'une science prolétarienne, Althusser began to deal with the past in a fashion that 
was also indicative of the way in which he would soon argue that Marxists should 
settle questions about present possibilities. Specifically, he argued that Marxists 
must deal with the past and with the present in a Marxian fashion, that is, by 
providing a thorough historical materialist account of why certain events occurred 
and why certain structures were now in place. Seconding Lecourt’s work on 
Lyssenkism as a move in the right direction, Althusser argued that historical 
materialism must account for why Stalin and Stalinism took place in Russia. This 
type of explanation, he argued, was precisely the business and responsibility of 
Marxists.10 
Shortly after making these claims about the ability and responsibility of 
Marxists to use the resources of historical materialism to account for past events, 
Althusser began to argue that—given sufficient analysis of the contemporary 
situation and of the historical events leading up to it—historical materialism also 
                                                
9 Louis Althusser, 1976, “The Crisis of Marxism, in Power and Opposition in Post-Revolutionary 
Societies, (ed.) Il Manifesto (London: Ink Links Ltd., 1979). 
10 Louis Althusser, 1976, “Avant-Propos” to Lyssenko, histoire réele d'une science prolétarienne by 
Dominique Lecourt (Paris: Maspero, 1976). 9-19. 
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had the power to indicate what events might be possible. So then, in an attempt to 
(yet again) save the Party from thoughtless “revisionisms” based on ideological 
notions about human nature and political possibilities as well as in an attempt to 
save the Party from its reflexive Stalinism, Althusser advanced the claim that, for 
the Party to realize its goals and to emerge from its crisis, “everything…depends on 
“the ‘concrete analysis of the ‘concrete situation’.”  
Though manifestly an argument for pursuing a critical theoretical approach 
to social scientific investigation, this call was not motivated by an intellectual 
affinity with the Frankfurt School (of which his knowledge remained limited) but by 
Lenin’s oft-repeated dictum that correct politics depends on the “concrete analysis 
of the concrete situation.” After Lenin, Concrete Analysis was promulgated by 
Althusser as a social scientific method of research that would be able to explain 
why certain events had occurred and to suggest what events are now possible.11 
More than this, in its critical function, it would have the power to explain the 
existence of, and correct for, the faulty notions held by the proletariat and 
bourgeoisie about the nature of the world and about “what is to be done” 
politically. On the bourgeois side of the class struggle, these false ideas or 
“spontaneous philosophies” naturalized the status quo, making the norms that 
direct and validate bourgeois actions seem intuitive. Done well, concrete analysis 
was intended to de-naturalize these norms, showing how changes in the mode of 
production occasioned specific beliefs and how such values allow the capitalist 
mode of production to function. In contrast to Stalin, Althusser also maintained that 
those on the other side of the class struggle held false beliefs. As this “spontaneous 
ideology” all too often betrayed their actual self-interest, compelling oppressed 
peoples to look towards existing institutions and to dominant notions of justice, 
freedom, and equality as the means and ideals necessary to the realization of their 
goals, it too needed to be critiqued.  
                                                
11 See for instance Lenin’s critique of Rosa Luxembourg for ignoring this step in “The Right of 
Nations to Self-Determination,” http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/ 
1914/self-det/ch02.htm (accessed 27, July 2006).  
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 As Althusser envisioned it, Concrete Analysis was meant to describe socio-
economic relations, to explain why certain ideologies existed, to correct for these 
ideologies, and to thereby allow for un- or less distorted political judgments by the 
Party. As a summary of the Leninist theory that inspired Althusser’s call for 
Concrete Analysis puts it 
The specific objective of party theoretical work is to analyze 
economic and political conditions sufficiently concretely to provide 
the basis for an effective political line. The ability to carry out 
concrete analysis is the fundamental precondition for a Leninist 
political practice. If inflexible organizational and political formulae 
are substituted for conclusions arrived at by concrete analysis, then 
the practice of the party is reduced to just one more random element 
within a political process which is not understood by those acting in 
it.12 
For Lenin in 1901, as with Althusser in 1976, the only hope for an effective 
political program—one that truly advanced communist goals—was one guided by 
a Party aware of historical possibilities and self-consciously reflective about its 
historical role.13 
 Unlike Lenin, whose polemics on behalf of Concrete Analysis seem 
designed to and did reinforce the authority of a Party elite, Althusser’s calls for 
Concrete Analysis were made in the context of a critique of PCF leadership for its 
failure to follow the “democratic” part of democratic centralism.14 In unpublished 
work from 1976 and 1977 that would soon find its most stinging form in the 
pamphlet Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans le partie communiste, Althusser argued 
that the lack of democratic discussion within the Party allowed for and encouraged 
the pursuit of ill-considered political projects and alliances such as the 
abandonment of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and opportunistic alliances with 
                                                
12 Anon., 1977, “The distinguishing features of Leninist Political practice,” Communist Formation, 
http://reality.gn.apc.org/polemic/leninsm.htm (accessed 27 July, 2006). 
13V. I. Lenin. What is to be done? (1901) http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/ 
works/1901/witbd/ii.htm#fwV05P384F01 (accessed 27 July, 2006). 
14 Louis Althusser, Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans le parti communiste (Paris: Maspero, 1978), 6ff; 
Althusser, Les Vaches noires, 1976-77, unpublished book draft, ALT2.A24-01.01, Folder 2 (Fonds 
Althusser), 19-19bis; and Elliot, Detour of Theory, 294, 304-05. 
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the Socialists.15 These projects and alliances relied upon the isolated, spontaneous 
ideological judgments of individuals rather than upon judgments based on concrete 
analyses and following from the public discussion of these analyses results.16 Such 
analyses, he contended, were necessary to inform democratic debate within the 
Party and to allow for correct decision making.  
In one of these unpublished works, Les Vaches noires (1976), Althusser 
recorded his discontent with Party practices in the wake of the PCF’s 22nd Congress. 
In a tone of obvious frustration, he noted that it was entirely possible for PCF 
congresses to be filled with debates but that these were too often squelched by 
calls for unity.17 Of those things that should have been debated (but were not) he 
lists four things. The first were resolutions on the Party’s direction for the immediate 
future, the second were the theses that define the proper usage of terms in Marxist 
political theory, and the third was the Party’s position in regards to governmental 
participation. The fourth thing that should have been debated (would that it had 
existed) was a “concrete analysis of the concrete situation.”18  
Though mentioned last, it is apparent from the attention paid in Les Vaches 
noires to Concrete Analysis’ delineation that Althusser believed these analyses to be 
of primary importance. Such work, he maintained, was the only thing that would 
allow for correct resolutions to be adopted, for terms to be defined properly, and 
for the Party’s strategic relationship to the state to be discerned. Not only were 
concrete analyses essential to informed democratic debate, Althusser insisted that 
they were also necessary if the Party wanted to resist its spontaneous impulses 
towards the adoption of certain platforms that could be deleterious to the 
movement as a whole. As he wrote: “Nothing about all of this [concrete analysis] is 
                                                
15 G. M. Goshgarian, Introduction to Philosophy of the Encounter and other Writings by Louis 
Althusser (London: Verso, 2006), xvi-xxvii. Althusser, Vaches noires, ALT2.A24-01.01, Folder 2 
(Fonds Althusser), 48-61. In “Notes de LA sur l’<<Interview Imaginaire>> ALT2.A24-04.01 (Fonds 
Althusser), Althusser diagrams the relations among Democratic Centralism, Concrete Analysis, and 
the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. 
16 Althusser, Vaches noires. Folder 2, ALT2.A24-01.01 (Fonds Althusser), 25. 
17 Althusser, Vaches noires. Folder 2, ALT2.A24-01.01 (Fonds Althusser), 19, 19bis.  
18 Althusser, Vaches noires. Folder 2, ALT2.A24-01.01 (Fonds Althusser), 22. 
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simple: but it is exactly because reality is complicated and highly contradictory that 
its analysis is necessary.”19 In the end, it was only the practice of Concrete Analysis 
that would allow individuals to participate in an informed debate and to come to a 
correct, collective, and democratic decision about what programs to pass and what 
theses to adopt. Such analyses, Althusser argued, were infinitely preferable to the 
spontaneous judgments made by Central Committee members that, if they were not 
made for “pragmatic” reasons, were based on “Marxist principles” believed to be 
known in advance of any proper analysis.20 
 
Althusser’s Original Formulation of Concrete Analysis 
 Thus far, this essay has focused on why Althusser believed that Concrete 
Analysis was necessary for the worker’s movement and for democratic practice and 
it has also specified what he believed it to be capable of doing. To sum up: 
Concrete Analysis was necessary because it allowed for political judgments to be 
made and to be debated which might allow the Party to realize its goals and 
because it corrected for ideological distortions that would otherwise compromise 
these judgments. Obviously, if any analysis could achieve these things, it would be 
worth pursuing. The clear question, though, is what science is capable of 
advancing an analysis that, being both empirical and critical, is able to overcome 
ideological beliefs in order to correctly describe a historical situation and its 
possibilities?  
It will surprise no one that the science Althusser judges capable of such 
results is historical materialism. Unlike “vulgar” sociology and economics (which 
study social and economic formations in their isolation and largely synchronically), 
Althusser believes that historical materialism can achieve these results because it 
takes the socio-economic whole to be constituted in and through history as a series 
                                                
19 Althusser, Vaches noires. Folder 2, ALT2.A24-01.01 (Fonds Althusser), 25. Translation is mine, all 
emphasis is Althusser’s. 
20 Althusser, Vaches noires. Folder 2, ALT2.A24-01.01 (Fonds Althusser), 25; and “Que faire?,” 
ALT2.A26-05.06 (Fonds Althusser), 25-26. 
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of antagonistic class relations that are always in flux.21 If all that existed was change 
there would, of course, be no regularities and the social sciences would have 
nothing to analyze. Modes of production, however, presents themselves as 
relatively stable. What historical materialism studies, therefore, are the relatively 
stable structures (norms, technologies, modes of exchange, etc.) that allow societies 
to reproduce themselves as well as the class struggles that not only allow this 
reproduction but that drive the change of these relatively stable formations into 
different formations marked by different struggles.22  
Though historical materialism does not pretend to be a comprehensive 
science, Althusser certainly intended for the sub-section of it that generates 
politically useful knowledge (i.e., Concrete Analysis), to be understood as a multi-
disciplinary pursuit marked by critical reflections on its results. That this is 
Althusser’s understanding of Concrete Analysis is shown not only by his 
longstanding insistence that sciences produce knowledge of the real but also by his 
argument that the sciences need to be subject to self and external criticism,23 
Indeed, this understanding is apparent in his delineation of Concrete Analysis’ 
necessary components in Les Vaches Noires. In this delineation, he states that, if 
Concrete Analysis is intended “to examine, from the class positions of the 
proletariat, at least the larger forms of actual class struggles,”24 then the analysis it 
makes must be both comprehensive and critical. For Althusser, comprehensiveness 
includes quite a few things. First, it must provide a description of the actual forms 
of imperialism, of the resistances that imperialism faces from the third world, of the 
actual forms of struggle undertaken by workers in the developed nations, and of the 
possibilities for real convergences and contradictions between these resistances. 
Second, it must provide an analysis of the effects of these contradictions on 
political struggles at both national and international levels and as these are effected 
                                                
21 Althusser, “Que faire?,” ALT2.A26-05.06 (Fonds Althusser), 1; and Vaches noires. Folder 2, 
ALT2.A24-01.01 (Fonds Althusser), 22. 
22 Althusser, “Que faire?,” ALT2.A26-05.06 (Fonds Althusser), 32-34. 
23 William Lewis. Louis Althusser and the Traditions of French Marxism (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2005), 193-198.  
24  Althusser, Vaches noires. Folder 2, ALT2.A24-01.01 (Fonds Althusser), 22. 
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by changes to capital’s economic strategy. Third, a full analysis must include a 
study of the effects of this economic and political class struggle on the ideological 
forms of the class struggle.25 Fourth and finally, a comprehensive Concrete Analysis 
must include an examination of the political effects, and even the electoral effects, 
of this ideological struggle such that the Party might understand why, in certain 
instances, it has lost votes and why, in other situations and at other times, it has 
gained them.26 
 Given Althusser’s description of its method and what it needs to be 
comprehensive, every Concrete Analysis would have to involve a battalion of 
scientists and critics. At the very least, this would include historians, sociologists, 
psychologists, economists, and statisticians, not to mention numerous sub-
specialists who would study such things as labor relations, the politics of 
developing nations, and the persuasive techniques of modern business and politics. 
Despite its size, this legion of scientists could only perform the necessary 
preliminary studies. In order to be sufficient to the task set for it, Concrete Analysis 
would also have to include a critical element. That is, the relations between its 
objects of study would have to be accounted for and an explanation given for why 
these forms of the class struggle indicate certain political possibilities and rule out 
others. Some group of critical theorists would also have to correct for the 
ideological biases of the scientists’, prejudices that influence their empirical studies 
and that effect these studies’ results.27 But this is only the beginning of Concrete 
Analysis’ critical task. It would not be finished until an account is provided of why 
certain political actions and certain goals are thought by certain groups to be 
                                                
25 Althusser, Vaches noires. Folder 2, ALT2.A24-01.01 (Fonds Althusser), 22-23. Regarding 
the effect of the economic and political class struggle on the ideological forms of the class 
struggle, Althusser notes that sufficient analysis will show that these effects include: “the 
transformation of the contents of a dominant ideology that is well “obliged” to align itself 
with the imperialist forms of the economic and political struggle and to throw onto the 
market new expressions of political publicity in order to sell the most advanced forms of 
class collaboration and in order to buy the consent of the labor aristocracy and to gain the 
complicity of large sections of the petty bourgeoisie…” 
26 Althusser, Vaches noires. Folder 2, ALT2.A24-01.01 (Fonds Althusser), 23-23bis. 
27 Althusser, “Philosophy and Spontaneous” 133.  
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desirable when, in reality, they are not in their best interest. Thus a Concrete 
Analysis sufficient to provide direction and to overcome ideological biases needs to 
explain such things as why labor shortages leads to the increased acceptance of 
worker’s demands for shorter days and benefits in some countries but not in others 
and also why some workers feel compelled to make this demand and others do not 
feel so compelled. It must then relate all of these various conditions or “forms of 
the class struggle” back to every other relevant instance such that individuals and 
groups might know when the political conjuncture is capable of being moved to 
satisfy a specific demand and also whether it is really in that group’s or individual’s 
best interest to make such a demand. Succinctly put, Concrete Analysis must 
provide an analysis of “whole” situations where the whole is understood to include 
all relevant ideological, political, economic, and scientific practices (or forms of 
class struggle) as well as the history of class struggles that have led up to this 
situation. 
In an unpublished work on Gramsci and Machiavelli from 1978, Althusser 
actually attempted such an analysis. However, it is pursued in a less than rigorous 
manner. In this “concrete analysis of the concrete situation,” he bases his 
conclusion that Italian auto workers should not engage in revolutionary struggles 
(even though many of these workers “know” this to be the best course of action) on 
loose speculation about the relationship between local factory conditions, the 
workers’ ideology, fordism, national production, and global capital flow. All of the 
data used to justify this conclusion and to suggest the utility of Concrete Analysis is 
gathered by Althusser from a single television documentary.28  
 
Critique of Concrete Analysis 
Obviously, this “couch potato” critical theory does not represent the best 
attempt at performing a concrete analysis. Nonetheless, there is good reason to 
suspect that—even given enormous scientific and critical resources—an analysis 
                                                
28 Althusser, “Que faire?,” ALT2.A26-05.06 (Fonds Althusser), 4-10. 
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that takes into account all relevant historical and present forms of the class struggle 
bearing on a certain conjuncture would never be achieved. Indeed, when Althusser 
shared his argument for Concrete Analysis with two thinkers who often shared his 
political commitments, their responses were that he should abandon his demand 
that the Party pursue such studies. One of them, the sociologist Michel Verret, 
argued that Concrete Analysis’ scope was too broad, that it seems to include 
everything, and that it does not limit itself to any definite historical period. Because 
its scale is so big, Verret suggested, there will inevitably be component parts of the 
critique that are judged by specialists to be incorrect. These mistakes, he advised, 
would permit the dismissal of the study as a whole before it was ever thoroughly 
examined.29 Like Verret, the philosopher Étienne Balibar also communicated to 
Althusser that he feared the contradictions, inevitable lacunae, and dead-ends 
which would inevitably accompany any such study would be used to invalidate it. 
He then advised Althusser to not be in a position of “preaching for concrete 
analysis without ever furnishing it. 30  
 No doubt, any person who is even moderately conversant with 
contemporary philosophy of social science could single-out flaws in Althusser’s 
delineation of Concrete Analysis in addition to those pointed out by Verret and 
Balibar. Perhaps chief among these would be Althusser’s assumption that, correctly 
done, Concrete Analysis will allow us to know in advance the correct political 
action to pursue. In this claim, Althusser seems to imply that, even though it is 
arrived at critically, the knowledge that Concrete Analysis establishes is somehow 
positive, objective, and even predictive. As the general opinion regarding social 
scientific knowledge is that it is conditional and historical: people might and do 
change their practices and their self-understandings such that yesterday’s truth 
about their beliefs and behaviors may today no longer be so, this last feature may 
be particularly surprising. To anyone familiar with the history of Althusser’s 
thoughts on the relationship between ideology, science and politics, the other two 
                                                
29 Michel Verret to Louis Althusser, 12 September, 1976, ALT2.A24-04.08 (Fonds Althusser) 
30 Étienne Balibar to Louis Althusser, 20 September, 1976, ALT2.A24-04.08 (Fonds Althusser).  
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features seem equally strange. From his juvenilia on through to his last remarks on 
aleatory materialism, Althusser never argued that science established positive 
knowledge. What’s more, after 1967, he repeated the claim over and over again 
that all knowledges are contaminated with ideology and that every knowledge 
claim advances a class position.31 Consistent with this position, he does indicate in 
Les Vaches noires that Concrete Analysis is always done from the class position of 
the proletariat. However, his argument as a whole suggests that the knowledge 
which results from this analysis is one mostly purged of both bourgeois and 
proletarian ideology. 
Given all of the criticisms to which Concrete Analysis is vulnerable, it is no 
wonder that Althusser took Verret’s advice and did not publish his work on the 
subject (though he continued to develop Concrete Analysis in private and 
published theoretical work propaedeutic to it on Marxist methodology).32 To a 
certain reading of Althusser, one that sees him as advancing progressively weaker 
claims about the power of historical materialism to explain history, it would be 
easy to argue that Althusser himself gave up on his grand ambitions for Concrete 
Analysis and that those interested in reconstructing such a flawed project should do 
so as well. However, Althusser himself never gave up on historical materialist forms 
of explanation33 and, despite Concrete Analysis’ manifest failings, there are very 
good reasons to attempt to preserve and reconstruct this method. This is the case 
because a Concrete Analysis advancing much more modest claims might still be 
very useful politically and because the knowledge that it produces may still have 
some pretension to scientific status. This is especially the case if one champions a 
Concrete Analysis that, unlike Althusser’s original formulation, is consistent with 
his larger claims about the relationships between philosophy, science, ideology, 
and politics.  
                                                
31 See especially Réponse à John Lewis (Paris: Maspero, 1973). 
32 “Que faire” being the primary example of the unpublished work and the "Avant-Propos du livre 
de G. Duménil” a good example of the methodeutic.  
33 Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 194, 264. 
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It is these contentions that will be fleshed out in the remainder of this essay. 
However, so that we know what needs reconstructing, it might be best to single out 
some of the lacunae, aporiae, and contradictions in Althusser’s incomplete 
theorization of Concrete Analysis. First, it is apparent that Althusser did not 
sufficiently work out the link between the empirical practice of gathering 
information about social, political, economic, and ideological formations and the 
critical function that it must also perform. The question of how one legitimately 
goes from empirical analyses to policy recommendations or ideological critique 
was thus never answered. A related question to the one about ideological critique 
is that of how Concrete Analysis is able to correct for the ideological distortion 
caused by the perspective of the individual scientists.34 There are also the problems 
of scope of analysis and of the choice of its methods. Why, for instance, should 
one, pick out a specific historical period as that which is relevant to a given 
question of political action? Also, why should some sciences be deemed relevant in 
a study (for instance: history, economics, and sociology) while others (such as 
biology) are deemed irrelevant? Further, why are some effects seen as more 
important than others and why are some causes given priority over others in what 
are always already overdetermined socio-economic formations? historical 
materialism, has usually privileged economic practices but Althusser himself has 
argued that this should not always to be the case.35 How then do Concrete Analysts 
decide whether or not religion or the economy dominates peoples’ relations and 
how do they describe these relations? Finally, there is the problem of verification of 
the claims made by Concrete Analysis. Althusser does suggest one means of 
verification: the prosecution of a successful transition to communism via the 
Dictatorship of the Proletariat. However, short of this ultimate end being realized, 
how does one judge that the judgment about the correct political line to take 
                                                
34 Though it must be said that, with “Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists,” 
Althusser has given much thought to this question.  
35 Louis Althusser, For Marx. (London: New Left Books, 1977), 103-107. 
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arrived at by Concrete Analysis and democratic debate is better than that provided 
spontaneously, by ideology? 
 
Reconstructing Concrete Analysis 
Though respectable cases can be made for them, two understandings of 
social scientific practice can be rejected outright for the reconstruction of 
Althusserian Concrete Analysis. This is due to the fact that their ontological and 
epistemological assumptions differ so radically from Althusser’s as to be 
inassimilable. The first of these is the classical realist understanding of social 
science which holds that there exist social scientific laws that are external to the 
knower and that can be discovered by the proper methods of investigation and 
description. Though in the rhetoric surrounding Concrete Analysis Althusser 
sometimes suggests that it is capable of achieving these kinds of positive results, it 
is apparent from the bulk of his theoretical work that he rejects this sort of 
discovery as a possibility. The second school of thought in the social sciences that 
is inassimilable to Althusser’s is that which has variously been labeled the “post-
modern,” “discursivist,” or “neo-pragmatist,” perspective on the social sciences. 
While the naïve realist position suffers from excess positivism, these explanations of 
scientific knowledge suffer from excessive conventionalism and would be rejected 
by Althusser for not accepting the Marxian premise that there is a distinction 
between our "real relation" and our "imaginary" or "lived" relationship with the 
world. For Althusser, it is this difference that science uncovers and it is able to do 
so by the formulation of rules about the world that are testable and subject to 
revision. This is not the case with ideological principles.36  
Currently, there are two schools of thought in contemporary philosophy of 
social science that offer resources towards Concrete Analysis’ reconstruction. Like 
Althusser’s philosophy of science, these theories combine methodological 
naturalism with hermeneutic skepticism. These two theories are the Critical Realist 
                                                
36 Lewis, “Knowledge,” 467. 
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understanding of social science pioneered by Roy Bhaskar in the mid-1970s and 
the pragmatist perspective developed by James Bohman starting in the early 
1990s.37 Both schools strike a happy balance between naïve realist and discursivist 
understandings of social scientific practice. In that both also suggest that social 
scientific analysis and reflection upon its results is capable of performing the 
empirical and critical work that Concrete Analysis demands, both also share certain 
affinities with Althusser’s critical theory as a whole.  
 Not a few commentators have suggested that Critical Realism is the logical 
heir to the Althusserian critical project.38 Because it seems to share the bulk of 
Althusser’s ontological commitments, including that to causal realism, it does seem 
a very likely choice as a theory to fill-in Concrete Analysis’ holes and to overcome 
some of its contradictions. However, Critical Realism’s insistence that social 
science is dependent upon the pre-existence of social regularities is hard to gibe 
with an Althusserian philosophy which holds that social scientific laws or 
generalities are realized rather than discovered.39 This is especially true of the 
“transcendental realist” position as originally formulated by Bhaskar. It is also 
mostly true of those who more recently have tried to argue for a Critical Realism 
that does not rely upon transcendental argumentation.40 Further, those theories that 
are most successful in ridding Critical Realism of its reliance upon transcendental 
justification get closer and closer to advancing a pragmatist understanding of social 
science.41 As that branch of Critical Realism that is most compatible with 
                                                
37 Peter Manicas in A Realist Philosophy of Social Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006) suggests a theory that also seems compatible but which cannot be considered here. 
38 Roy Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality (London: Verso, 1989), 187-88; Andrew Collier, Scientific 
Realism and Socialist Thought (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), ix-x; and Ron Heisler, 
“Response to the Modern Ranters: A Layman's Naive Thoughts on the Cult of Roy Bhaskar” What 
Next? no. 18 (2001). http://www.whatnextjournal.co.uk/Pages/ 
Back/Wnext18/Bhaskar.html (accessed 26 July, 2006). 
39 Althusser, “Cours sur le mode d’exposition chez Marx,” ALT2.A28-01.05 (Fonds Althusser), 9. 
40 Stephen Kemp, “Critical Realism and the Limits of Philosophy,” European Journal of Social 
Theory. 8, no. 2, (2005): 171-191. 
41 Paul Lewis, “Realism, Causality and the Problem of Social Structure,” Journal for the Theory of 
Social Behavior 30, no. 3 (2000): 249-268; and Tuuka Kaidesoha, Journal of Critical Realism 4, no. 1 
(2005): 28-61; and Jan J. J. M. Wuisman, “The Logic of Scientific Discovery in Critical Realist and 
Social Scientific Research” Journal of Critical Realism 4, no. 2 (2005): 366-394. 
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Althusser’s is tending towards pragmatism anyway, it may be simpler and more 
efficacious to bracket Critical Realism’s discussion and to skip directly to the 
consideration of a philosophy of social science that seems immediately compatible: 
namely, Pragmatic Critical Social Theory.  
 As mentioned above, the critical social theory that this paper maintains has 
interesting affinities with Althusser’s understanding of the relationship between 
philosophy, politics, science, and ideology is the pragmatist one developed over 
the last decade, principally by James Bohman but also and more recently by Osmo 
Kivinen and Tero Piiroinen.42 Recognizing an explicit debt to the Deweyan 
understanding of social science as the best means by which useful knowledge 
about our social relations is discovered and emphasizing the utility and necessity of 
social scientific knowledge to democratic political formations,43 this understanding 
of social science does not immediately announce itself as compatible with a theory 
like Althusser’s predicated upon the existence of class struggle. However, when 
one looks at its features more closely, Pragmatic Critical Social Theory not only 
shares many features with Concrete Analysis, it also corrects for some of Concrete 
Analysis’ more obvious flaws and renders its theory and method more compatible 
with Althusser’s statements between 1967 and 1978 about the relationship 
between economics, politics, science and ideology.  
 In Bohman’s description of it in the essays “Theories, Practices, and 
Pluralism” and “Democracy as Inquiry, Inquiry as Democratic,” Pragmatic Critical 
Social Theory appears designed to function politically much like Althusser’s 
Concrete Analysis.. By drawing on the best resources of contemporary social 
science, Pragmatic Critical Social Theory is presented as capable of performing 
ideological critiques and of supplying knowledge about human social relations that 
can inform democratic deliberation and that can be put to practical use. However, 
                                                
42 Osmo Kivinen and Tero Piiroinen, “The Relevance of Ontological Commitments in Social 
Sciences: Realist and Pragmatist Viewpoints” Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 34, no. 
3(2004): 231-248. 
43 Peter Manicas, “John Dewey and American Social Science” pages 43-62 in: Larry Hickman (ed.), 
Reading Dewey (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998). 
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unlike Althusser’s description of Concrete Analysis in Les Vaches noires which puts 
the critic in a position of epistemic authority, Bohman maintains that every scientist 
and every critic is socially embedded and that their evaluative frameworks are 
influenced by this position.44 In addition to solving the problem of latent positivism 
in Althusser’s formulation of Concrete Analysis, it also solves the problem of the 
necessary scope of Concrete Analysis’ research. By dint of their subject positions, 
any researcher or group of researchers will pick out certain problems as worthy of 
investigation and they will pick out certain domains of scientific investigation 
whose objects seem related to the problem.45 For example, present concerns about 
public health and the spread of HIV could motivate a study of conspiracy theories 
among African-Americans regarding the virus and about how these beliefs function 
in a specific community.46 Such a study could then be combined with historical, 
epidemiological, economic, and psychological studies to indicate how, in what 
way, and to what extent attitudes and behaviors might be altered such that the virus 
be contained. This does not mean that the scope of any particular investigation 
cannot be expanded when time periods, practices, sentiments, or events that at first 
did not seem relevant now appear to be related. It also and especially does not 
mean that the scope of an analysis cannot be expanded after the investigation is 
completed. If, in democratic dialogue between groups and individuals about the 
results of an inquiry, it is pointed out that a Concrete Analysis missed considering 
relevant practices or beliefs, then the analyst has a duty to go back and investigate 
these phenomena.47 
                                                
44 James Bohman, “Critical Theory as Practical Knowledge” in The Blackwell Guide to the 
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, (eds.) Stephen Turner and David Roth (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 
2003), 96-98; and James Bohman, “Democracy as Inquiry, Inquiry as Democratic: Pragmatism, 
Social Science, and the Cognitive Division of Labor,” American Journal of Political Science 43, no. 2 
(April 1999): 593, 605. 
45James Bohman, “Theories, Practices, and Pluralism,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 29, no. 4 
(1998): 472. 
46 William Paul Simmons and Sharon Parsons, “Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories Among  
African Americans: A Comparison of Elites and Masses,” Social Science Quarterly 86, no. 3 (Sept 
2005): 582-598. 
47 Bohman, “Theories,” 478. 
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 Not only is the recognition that any specific Concrete Analysis will be 
limited by an individual’s or group’s subject position a more reasonable 
assumption (as well as one seconded by recent work in feminist philosophy of 
science),48 it also is more Althusserian in that it accords with his theories of 
ideology and overdetermination.49 This does not mean (for Bohman or for 
Althusser) that scientific knowledge and ideological knowledge are 
indistinguishable. However, both would maintain that those who engage in sincere 
social scientific inquiry are more apt to be able to manage their lives and to direct 
society to desired conclusions than those who do not. Both would also maintain 
that the most useful knowledge does not result from solitary scientific investigation. 
Rather, as indicated by Althusser’s inventory of the social scientific and critical 
work needed to give a useful picture of the relations between various class 
struggles in Les Vaches noires and as stated explicitly by Bohman in his article 
“Theories, Practices and Pluralism,” critical social theories rely on a plurality of 
investigators inquiring into many domains of human conduct.50  
 Not only are there many affinities between Althusser’s and Bohman’s views 
on the constitution of political or ideological subjects and of the relation of these 
subjects to scientific research, but there are also marked similarities between 
Concrete Analysis and Pragmatic Critical Social Theory in their understandings of 
what criticism does and of when and how the knowledge that criticism produces 
can be judged to be correct. Bohman assigns the scientifically informed pragmatic 
critic the role of calling to peoples’ attention when their self-conceptions and their 
conceptions about the behavior of others does not jibe with scientific knowledge.51 
He also charges them with providing possible explanations based on critical 
                                                
48 Jaggar, Allison.“Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology” Inquiry 32, no. 3 (Sept 
1989): 151-176; and Helen Longino, Science as Social Knowledge (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1990), 62-82. 
49 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” in Lenin and Philosophy (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1971); and “Contradiction and Overdetermination” in For Marx. London: 
New Left Books, 1977. 
50 Bohman, “Theories,” 469.  
51 Bohman, “Critical Theory,” 102. 
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analysis of why these beliefs do not match.52 This role is very similar to that 
assigned to the philosopher by Althusser during his course on the Spontaneous 
Philosophy of the Scientists (1966). Here, he argued that—insofar as they act as a 
liaison between scientists and the public—the role of the materialist philosopher is 
to intercede in politics on behalf of science such that ideological positions that 
inform politics and that retard political change might be overcome.53  
 In regard to Althusser’s and Bohman’s understanding of when a critical 
social theory can be judged to be correct, Bohman provides a criterion that seems 
much more attainable than that of attending a successful transition to communism. 
As Althusser had given up the dream of full human freedom long before his 
championing of Concrete Analysis in the late nineteen-seventies,54 this more 
modest measure is also consistent with Althusser’s mature understanding of history 
and ideology. In addition, Bohman’s criterion that we see critical social theory to 
be correct when people use its insights to change their lives is realistic in the 
Althusserian (and, indeed, Marxian) sense of the term: the real is what is realized. 
By appealing to this manifestly pragmatic criterion, it has the advantage of avoiding 
problems with external verification that plague positivist and constructivist 
understandings of scientific truth.  
 If Bohman’s work on Pragmatic Critical Social Theory pretty much gets it 
right and corrects for the more obvious holes and contradictions in Althusser’s 
method of concrete analysis and if, in the process, it delivers a tenable critical 
social theory, then why take the long detour that this paper has made through the 
theory of Concrete Analysis, a theory that Althusser himself never fully developed? 
Well, in addition, to the historical value of such a study, there is reason to 
emphasize and support certain of Althusser’s claims that differ from Bohman’s. 
These differences remain even after—with Bohman’s help—Concrete Analysis has 
been reconstructed so as to be more in line with contemporary philosophy of social 
                                                
52 Bohman, “Critical Theory,” 96. 
53 Lewis, “Knowledge,” 464. 
54 Louis Althusser, 1967, “The Historical Task of Marxist Philosophy” in The Humanist Controversy 
and Other Writings, ed. François Matheron (London: Verso, 2003), 185-190. 
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science and with Althusser’s mature understanding of the relationship between 
philosophy, science, ideology, and politics. The most prominent of these 
differences is Althusser’s insistence that there is an overarching science, historical 
materialism, that structures and allows critical social scientific investigations. 
Bohman rejects the idea that such a comprehensive science exists and argues that a 
Pragmatic Critical Social Theory gains nothing from it. He also argues that it and 
similar notions prematurely prejudice an investigation and its results.55 As it would 
be extremely difficult to conceive of an Althusserian Critical Theory that does not 
depart from Historical Materialist premises, this is an important difference between 
Bohman and Althusser and one that warrants investigation.56 Nevertheless, this 
distinction does not detract from this paper’s overall argument that the method of 
Concrete Analysis, reconstructed to be consistent with Althusser’s understanding of 
the relationship between philosophy, science, ideology, and politics looks very 
much like a Pragmatic Critical Social Theory. Nor does it detract from this paper’s 
larger argument that critical social scientific inquiries of the sort suggested by 
Bohman and by this paper’s critical reconstruction of Concrete Analysis are useful 
to democratic decision making. However, it does preserve something of Marx’s 
understanding of science and history that are worth holding on to both for the sake 
of democratic practice and for democracy’s achievement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
55 Bohman “Theories,” 468 
56 A future paper will examine what role Historical Materialism has to play in Pragmatic Critical 
Social Theory.  
